An expository sermon on holy living

An expository sermon on holy living An expository sermon on Holy Living Introduction How many of you feel Holy this morning? Dont worry you dont have to lift up your hands. When some one talks about Holiness the first thing I think about it God and His holiness. This morning I want to talk about our call to a holy livinglife. We all know that we are called to live a holy life but what do we do about it. DO we make any effort towards it or are we just praying for God to make us Holy and waiting for fire to fall down from heaven to make us Holy. We live in a world where holiness has lost its meaning. In this contemporary society everything goes, we can do anything as long as we feel good about it. What is our responsibility in this world, What are we called to do in this un holy situation? So we are going to look at the reasons why we are called to live a Holy life. Main Points 1. We are called to live a holy life because He is holy (1: 16) A] Real meaning of holy The word Holy is derived from a cluster of words in Greek. It means to be pure, to be set apart, sanctify and so on. But no meaning of this word can describe it properly.[1] Christ was the perfect example for Holiness. Be Holy for I am Holy is mentioned for about 5 times in the Bible. Holiness is not a new thing which the apostles discovered in the New Testament, it was present from the beginning of the Old Testament. He God gave Moses all the laws not to make their life difficult but to bring them one step closer to holiness; one step closer to Himself. B] One of the fundamental characteristics of God Gods Holiness can neither be understood nor grasped by our human minds. Holiness is one of the images of God which was lost in the garden of Eden. It could be only replaced by God Himself, by dying on the cross and making us pure. HE is always Holy. We are called to live like Him. So we are called to be Holy. When we were made we were made in the image of God. One of His fundamental images is holiness. So we were obviously made Holy. But we fell from our holiness because of our disobedience. We are missing out in one of the fundamental images of God. We have to be made into his image so one day we can see His face. If we are not made into His image we will not see Him face to face. It is just as simple as that; if we are not holy, we will not see God. C] Illustration Once, as an experiment, the great scientist Isaac Newton stared at the image of the sun reflected in a mirror. The brightness burned into his retina, and he suffered temporary blindness. Even after he hid for three days behind closed shutters, still the bright spot would not fade from his vision. I used all means to divert my imagination from the sun, he writes, But if I thought upon him I presently saw his picture though I was in the dark. If he had stared a few minutes longer, Newton might have permanently lost all vision. The chemical receptors that govern eyesight cannot withstand the full force of unfiltered sunlight. There is a parable in Isaac Newtons experiment, This is what the Israelites experienced in the wilderness. They had attempted to live with the Lord of the Universe visibly present in their midst; but, in the end, out of all the thousands who had so gladly fled Egypt, only two survived Gods Presence. They were all revealed and called to be Holy as God. But only two survived in the end.[2] 2. We are called to live a holy life because we do not conform to evil desires (1: 14) A] We also have our share in Holiness (Hebrews 12: 14) It is true that when we come to salvation in Christ He washes all our sins away and makes us Holy. We become perfect and clean through Jesus, but it is our duty to then keep ourselves clean. Holiness is not only what God can give to us but it is also what we can manifest with what He gave us. Paul says it quite clearly in Hebrews 12 : 14 (NIV) To make Make every effort to live in peace with all men and to be Holy. ; Without without which we cannot see Godholiness no one will see the Lord. Holiness is a serious matter. We tend to take God for granted. When we give in or conform to the evil desires of the world, we say that it wasnt our fault but it is our flesh. We blame it on our human nature. Paul challenges us not to try to be holy but take every effort possible in other words we must strive or even fight to be Holy. Effort means to use energy to get something done.[3] Holiness should be such a longing of our heart that we would put our whole energy to get it done. B] No compromise in Holiness Holiness is being spotlessly clean. Without Holiness we can never enter the presence of God. The Old Testament priests were the perfect example of this. The priest entered the presence of God only once a year. They dreaded that moment. Thought it was regarded very high to enter the Holy of Holies, it was dreadful at the same time. In that moment if they were found guilty of sin , there was no time for explanation they were just struck dead. They prepared themselves for the whole year for that one day in Gods presence, the presence of the Holy God. We are so privileged that there is no curtain between God and us, we dont need a high priest to stand in for us anymore, Christ has already done it for us. We can enter Gods presence anytime anywhere we want. As for us its not a once a year thing its an every day thing. WE are living in the age of grace, God does not strike us dead anymore, though grace is available for free it is not cheap, so let us not take it for granted. C] Illustration In the forests of northern Europe and Asia lives little animal called the ermine, known for his snow-white fur in winter. He instinctively protects his white coat against anything that would soil it. Fur hunters take advantage of this unusual trait of the ermine. They dont set a snare to catch him, but instead they find his home, which is usually a cleft in a rock or a hollow in an old tree. They smear the entrance and interior with grime. Then the hunters set their dogs loose to find and chase the ermine. The frightened animal flees toward home but doesnt enter because of the filth. Rather than soil his white coat, he is trapped by the dogs and captured while preserving his purity. For the ermine, purity is more precious than life. HGB[4] It doesnt always cost our lives to be Holy. But most of the time it could cost things or people that are dear to our hearts. When we are of this world, we make the things of the world our own. We usually cling to things and people which could take Gods place in our lives. So when we come to Christ we ought to replace them with Christ. When we do the right thing, even our own friends might not understand us, their there might even come times where we have to give them up for holiness, for there is no compromise on Holiness. 3. We are called to live a holy life because we were redeemed by the precious blood. (1: 23) A] Free access to Holiness The way of Holiness (Isaiah 35 : 8) It is true that we dont have to do anything to become Holy because we are washed by His blood. But we have to take effort in keeping it. It is quite clear in Isaiah 35: 8 that the way to God is holiness, there is no other way. Christ has done his part, by making the way. But to keep our self on the highway or to get kicked off lies on our hands. There is no place for unclean or wicked people on this road. B] Set Apart to be an example We are set apart and called to be holy not to seclude ourselves from the world but to be the light. D.L. Moody, A holy life will make the deepest impression. Lighthouses blow no horns, they just shine. One of the misconceptions in the churches today is that they become holy and they become literally set apart. They dont associate or mingle with the people of this world. They develop something which is famously called as the Holy huddle. They become so holy that the people of this world cannot even get close to them, they just have to be set apart. But that is not what God has called us to be. The difference between the Pharisees and Jesus was that Jesus toughed touched the unclean but they didnt. The Pharisees where were Holy as well, they did everything God commanded them to, but they didnt understand it. We are not called to be a Pharisee but we are called to be more like Him. We are not made Holy to be set in museums as specimens but to reach out to the unclean in turn. When we be come holy day by day let us be humbled by the fact that we dont deserve it , but it is through grace. Reach out to make them Holy. As the story of Isaac Newtons experience let our holiness hurt their eyes, not to chase them away from us but to draw them closer to Him who has called us to be Set apart, to be Holy. In conclusion let us make every effort to be more like Him every day. Let us just not sit back and pray for holiness but take every effort to be holy. Holiness is not only what God gives us but it is what we manifest with what He gave. Let us not compromise with the things of the world. Are we willing to lay down everything to pursue holiness? Holiness is not only works and deeds but is also passionately pursuing a relationship with God. Let us never compromise with holiness. If you are thinking that you have done all these all through out your life. Youve always been pursuing God for holiness and have a wonderful relationship with God, then dont become a Pharisee. Let us not settle down in that place in a holy huddle but let us affect others with our holiness. Let us be a light shining in this unholy land. We are set apart not to be in a museum but to be a light, that hurts the eyes but still draws them closer. Bibliography http://bible.org/illustration/ermine [03 September 2009] Fwd. Ogilvie, L. J. Nelsons Three in One Bible Reference Companion Nashville: Thomas nelson Publisher, 1982 [03 September 2009] Ed.. Martin Ralph p. and Davids, Peter H, Dictionary of the Latter New Testament and its development Leicester: Inter Varsity Press, 1997. [1] Ed. Ralh P. Martin and Peter H. Davids, Dictionary of the Latter New Testament and its development (Leicester: Inter Varsity Press, 1997), p. 485. [2] [03 September 2009] [3] Fwd. Dr. Llyod John Ogilvie, Nelsons Three in One Bible Reference Companion (Nashville: Thomas nelson Publisher, 1982), p. 206. [4] http://bible.org/illustration/ermine [03 September 2009]

Oscar Mayer Case Study

1. ) At first, Marcus McGraw found the challenge so complex and saw it a difficult task because he had not sat down to put down the ideas on paper and evaluate the situation carefully. He was just thinking of the difficult task ahead and not how to assail the problem. He was missing parts of the puzzle, he was not evaluating anything as yet or trying to formulate or implement any strategy. He had no option, no solution immediately after he read the McTiernan report. He had not done any ‘strategic planning’ thus, his perspective was different than after he had read the memos.After reading the memos from his colleagues, he realized that he could count on them since they had great ideas and were persons with great capability for these types of concerns and issues, especially when he read the one of his long time colleague and friend. McGraw pursues that decision making process of gathering information, generating ideas, looking at the ‘pros and cons’ of the sit uation that Oscar Mayer faces through his associates. He follows them and his mind guides him knowing that he can trust on his department managers. Marcus McGraw purses a decision making that is unbiased.He does not go for just one department; he follows all four managers. He was unbiased in this way and was a good strategy as well since the managers have that market-driven strategy which is healthy for the firm. They are well market-oriented and are able to distinguish the capabilities of Oscar Mayer just as they are able to match the customer value requirements to capabilities. They were cognizant that the market is more competitive, they also pointed out that introducing new lines of product could bring prosperity to Oscar Mayer, which is one of the suggestions that McTiernan had brought up.Therefore, McGraw’s decision making process of taking the ideas of all four managers was a wise one. 2. ) If McGraw chooses the favors of only one department then he is risking all othe r departments. In a business you cannot only favor and invest in one department only. All departments are important components for success of the business. If you only focus on one department, then the other departments will eventually collapse thus the company is losing on other areas in the market where profits can be made.This also means that the firm no longer has that diversity in products which reflects negatively on the company. McGraw can mitigate the damage by improving each of the departments so that they become more competitive in the market. He could also diversify in products just as was recommended by a couple of his managers thus making him a tough competitor on the market if adequately and carefully strategized. He will surely need to invest quite a lot on advertising and promotion which will reduce their profits in the short term; however, they will experience growth and profits in the long-term.As mentioned, once each department is improved and with the right strat egy, Oscar Mayer will benefit and improve the sectors of quality, quantity and price. They have done it before and the can only be better and will concentrate in satisfying consumers’ needs and wants. 3. ) First of all, let’s list the Strengths and Weaknesses. Strengths: Well-known Brand, Technology Skills in R&D, Strong Distribution Channels, Relatively High Market Share, High Profit Margin, Successful History and Product Diversification. Weaknesses: Relatively High Price, Not Healthy (High fat content).Oscar Mayer has a relatively high market share already, and a relatively low market growth. Due to its strengths, it already has a high market share and due to its weakness and the new trend in the market which is looking for products with lower fat (healthier), and lower prices, Oscar Mayer is losing its market growth. This is obviously a great threat to Oscar Mayer in terms of competition since the consumers are now looking for lower prices in those products, as well as healthier meats. This is detrimental to the firm on its entirety as fewer products sold would mean fewer sales which mean less profit.The competition also affects the â€Å"second brand† since the decrease in sale of the Oscar Mayer products also affects Louis Rich as it is looked as a total, thus Louis Rich revenues are compensating for the loss in Oscar Mayer. The investment decision then will change. The objectives are to increase annual production growth over the next three years by 4% in volume. Products will need to be reduced due to the competition so this affects how much to invest in quality and on the outstanding strength on Louis Rich in order to keep up the good record.There is much advertising and promotion to do; therefore they might have to lower the budget figures for this expense if sales decrease. They need to advertise on the already existing products, such as the health aspect of it, as well as on new products that will be produced. Therefore Oscar May er needs to ensure that they can prosper in the competition with all the expense that waits. 4. ) From the four departmental options, Jim Longstreet’s advice seems more viable. Not only was Jim’s advice an effective one, but his ideas also passed McTiernan’s wish for improved convenience.What Jim is doing by this is what is called ‘Differentiation Strategy’. The firm will provide a superior performance product uniquely designed to provide value to their target audience and is well appreciated by them. Oscar Mayer will also use their strengths to make this strategy a successful one. Having used their strong ability of R&D, they are already aware of who the target audience is and what that are looking for. Two products have been designed for their needs which are â€Å"Zappetites† and â€Å"Lunchables. † With this innovation, Oscar Mayer has all the potential and resources to remain the leader.The second best strategy I would say is Jane Morely’s idea. To obtain smaller companies that are competent and provide something Oscar Mayer does not provide is indeed a good strategy. The only disadvantage is that OM would have to increase their debt to acquire these companies not being completely sure if these companies would succeed. Advertising and packaging would also have its cost, however it doesn’t mean it won’t benefit in the longer run. Thos have their benefits; they hold great value when you count on consumer convenience and brand growth.If the companies succeed then automatically there are great sales increases which bring about profit. The least viable would be Rob’s idea of backing Louis Rich. Having all the strengths and the brand name of Oscar Mayer and just letting it go would be not just a waste but a huge loss. OM has had the majority of the company’s profits for a long time and has been the leading brand. For one, LR is increasing but at a slow pace. Then advertisements w ill be a huge expense which of course does not mean that it will increase the volume of sales.Therefore centralizing in just one brand, LR would not be a good idea for Oscar Mayer. 5. ) With the statistics given we can observe that McGraw wants a 15% increase on operating income while the managers are projecting a decrease of 5. 2% from the current year. If McGraw were to keep his A&P budget the same as last years, he would save $32MM over the managers' projections. Therefore,  one solution could be to effectively use the strengths of the product lines and the A;P dollars by consolidating his sub-divisions.The Division Performance table demonstrates exactly where the successes and failures of each sub-division are, and also shows their strengths and weaknesses. We can see that A ; P for Oscar Mayer has been decreasing and operating income increasing slowly. On the other hand, Louis Rich’s A ; P expense has been increasing while operating income has also been increasing by a great difference. This is also a key factor in the success of LR and partly, although not much, why OM has had a decrease in sales.Another factor in the decrease of Oscar Mayer brand is due to consumer trend as well as increased competition in the market. Oscar Mayer has so far opted to lose market share rather than lower its price. Based on the analysis, there is more to lose if  the Oscar Mayer brand is allowed to wilt over the Louis Rich Brand. Giving up on Oscar Mayer would mean losing its well established, well recognized OM brand name and its equity. May be even future profitability may be lost if the trend towards white meat is only a temporary one.This can be seen in  McTiernan's Report on consumer satisfaction survey, in which the red meat out performs in overall taste and compares well with respect to convenience. Therefore, another strategy is to build up the Oscar Mayer Brand, to merge the Louis Rich brand under Oscar Mayer, for example co-brand, and to introduce ne w packaging of their products (e. g. Lunchables and Zappetites), some white and some red meat to recapture the lost  market share. To consolidate the distribution and A&P spending around the Oscar Mayer's well established brand.Actions In accordance  with the above strategy we would suggest that Oscar Mayer and Louis Rich Brand modify and develop an integrated strategy which would require altering the existing branding strategy to accommodate the consumer trends, to extend the product line and to competitively price the OM products. Oscar Mayer needs to also not lose the taste when improving the quality of the product healthier, which is another step that would be taken and at the same time be convenient. By maintaining the quality it already is contributing its part to success.Another strategic goal is to achieve is long term gains and accelerate brand growth. With all this said, we need not to forget to invest in LR in order for the brand to grow as well. 6. ) Of the two produ cts Jim Longstreet suggested, I believe â€Å"Lunchables† is less likely to succeed especially since they are completely new to this product. Unlike Zappetites they had previously done Stuff ‘n Burgers so they do have an idea of how to approach the new product. Zappetites would create certain products that could also be used for lunch by certain consumers who desire hat ready to eat product. Lunchables would be more difficult to succeed due to all the details that a lunch entails and the different wants of the consumers. They are already thinking of packing a chocolate treat with it as well; not everyone eats or likes chocolates. Another issue with Lunchables is the ingredients. Some of the ingredients they would want to use have a short shelf life which would turn away many consumers. We need to keep in mind that everyone is different and have a different taste, many individuals are ‘picky. ’

Macroeconomics – institutions by Acemoglu

In Progress. Abstract: In this paper, we discuss how and why institutions— broadly, the economic and political organization of societies— affect economic incentives and outcomes. After briefly surveying a number of theories of institutional differences across countries, we focus on two questions: why societies may choose institutions that are not good for economic development, and why institutions, even bad Institutions, persist.In light of the Ideas we develop, we discuss three case studies of Institutions alluding and persistence: the united States, India and Guatemala. L. Introduction Institutions, defined broadly as the political and economic organization of societies, differ markedly across countries and over time. For example, until recently, a large number of societies were organized along socialist lines, with widespread collective ownership of the means of production and centrally planned resource allocation, while much of the rest of the world was capitalist, with predominantly private ownership and resources allocated Vela markets.For much of the 1 8th and 9th centuries, a number of societies, Including the Caribbean, much of Central and Latin America, and parts of Asia, were organized with political and economic power concentrated in the hands of a small elite, and relied on productive relationships based on slavery and forced labor. In contrast, economic and political power was more equally distributed in parts of Europe, North America and Australia, and the majority of laborers were free.Similarly, as emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), North and Whiniest (1989) and Till (1 990), there were Important differences In the organization of the European societies during the 17th century. While England and the Netherlands had developed limited governments, France and Spain had absolutist regimes.Economic theory and basic common sense suggest that differences in the organization of society should have an effect on economic outcomes: when institutions ensure that a potential investor has property rights over the proceeds from his Investments, he Is more likely to invest than when he expects the fruits of his efforts to be taken by other parties In the economy or by the government. An obvious hypothesis is then to link variations in economic performance across countries to their institutions. We refer to this point of view as the institutions hypothesis.According to one version of this hypothesis, what is crucial is whether the organization of the society ensures that a broad cross-section of the society have effective property rights, so that those with productive emphasis on â€Å"a broad cross-section of the society' is meant to capture the notion that it is not sufficient for the rights of a small elite, landowners, dictators or Politburo members, to be enforced. Citizens need to have effective property rights, and be involved in politics, at least some degree, to ensure the continuation of these repertory rights in the future.Do we see marked differences in the economic performance of societies with different institutions? The examples mentioned in the first paragraph suggest so: while West Germany prospered with a capitalist system, East Germany did much less well under socialism. While Western Europe, North America and Australia grew rapidly, the elite-dominated societies of the Caribbean, Central America and India stagnated throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. As emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), while England and the Netherlands prospered during the 17th century, Spain and France failed to do so.Also telling are cases where large changes in institutions are correlated with radically changed growth paths. Examples of this are Argentina in the sass's with the rise of populism and Person, South Korea during the early sass's with the transition from the Rhea to the Park regime, and Indonesia in 1965 with the transition between Saguaro and Short. In addition to these selective examp les, much empirical evidence suggests that institutional differences are a major source of the differences in economic performance across countries.For example, cross-country work by a number of economists and political scientists found a first-order effect of institutions on growth or the level of income (e. G. , Knack and Keeper, 1995, or Hall and Jones, 1999). More recently, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) we found that as much as % of the income gap between the top and bottom of the world income distribution may be due to differences in their institutions. 4 But these findings pose as many questions as they answer: 1 . If some institutions generate more income and growth, why do a large number of societies adopt institutions that are bad for economic development? . Why do institutions that are detrimental to economic performance persist rather than being overhauled at the first opportunity? Despite the importance of these questions for understanding differences in econ omic performance across countries, there is relatively little research on this topic. In this paper, we develop a number of conjectures related to these questions. Then, in light of these ideas, we discuss three case studies of institution building and persistence: the U. S. , India and Guatemala.In the process, we also provide a brief survey of a number of theories of comparative institutions. II. Institutions As emphasized in the introduction, our focus is on the set of institutions— the organization of society— that determine economic incentives. Why such institutions and social arrangements will affect economic outcomes is clear: economic actors will only undertake investments when they expect to be rewarded for their spending and effort. In a society where property rights are not well enforced, investment and output will be low.We therefore take the degree of enforcement of property rights to be a central feature of the institutions and the broad organization of a society. To of private property, which we take to correspond to a set of institutions ensuring that a broad cross-section of society have effective property rights. 2. Extractive institutions, which place political power in the hands of a small elite. With extractive institutions, the majority of the population does not have effective property rights, since the political power of the elite means that they can hold up the citizens after they undertake their investments.We expect institutions of private property to encourage investment and development, while extractive institutions are less likely to dead to high investment and successful economic outcomes. Notice that there is more to institutions than the legal code or the formal definition of property rights at a point in time; in particular, political institutions matter. This is for the simple reason that in a society where there are few constraints on political elites, these agents can change the legal code or manipulate the ex isting property rights to their advantage. Therefore, effective constraints on political elites are an essential ingredient of institutions of private property. In reality, there are many intermediate cases teens the extremes of institutions of private property and extractive institutions, and a complex interaction between the exact form of the political and economic institutions and whether they provide effective property rights protection to citizens. There is also a deep and difficult question of how the state commits to providing property rights to the citizens (see Whiniest, 1997, for a discussion of this problem).To limit the discussion, we do not focus on these issues. So what determines whether a society ends up with institutions of private property or extractive institutions? Let us distinguish four broad theories, which we call: 1. The efficient institutions view. 2. The incidental institutions view. 3. The rent-seeking view. 4. The inappropriate institutions view. We now discuss what we mean by these different views, and examine some selective examples of institutional theories falling within each category. . The Efficient Institutions View According to this view, societies will choose the institutions that maximize their total surplus. How this surplus will be distributed among different groups or agents does not affect the choice of institutions. The underlying reasoning of this view comes from the Cease Theorem. Ronald Cease (1960) argued that when different economic parties could negotiate costless, they will be able to bargain to internalize potential externalities.The farmer, who suffers from the pollution created by the nearby factory, can pay the factory owner to reduce pollution. The same reasoning can be applied to political situations. If the current laws or institutions benefit a certain group while creating a disproportionate cost for another, these two groups can negotiate to change the institutions. By doing so they will increase the size of the total surplus (â€Å"the pie† that they have to divide between themselves), and they can hen bargain over the distribution of this additional surplus.Many different versions of the efficient institutions view have been proposed. Demesne (1967) argued that private property emerged from common property when land become sufficiently scarce and valuable that it was efficient to privative it. Other famous examples are Case's (1936) earlier work and the more formal analysis by Grossman and Hart (1986), is more concerned with the governance of firms or markets than the political organization of societies, but his reasoning was guided by the same principle.North ND Thomas applied this reasoning to the nature of feudal institutions arguing that they were an efficient contract between serfs and Lords. While Williamson and North and Thomas do not specify how different parties will reach agreement to achieve efficient institutions, Becker (1960) and Whitman (1989) have invest igated how democracies can reach such agreements via competition among pressure groups and political parties.In their view, an inefficient institution cannot be stable because a political entrepreneur has an incentive to propose a better institution and with the extra surplus generated will be able to make him more attractive to voters. We believe that, despite correctly emphasizing certain forces that are likely to be at work, the efficient institutions view does not provide the right framework for an analysis of the differences in institutions across countries. Both historical and econometric evidence suggests that the economic costs to societies of extractive institutions have been substantial.For example, our estimates in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) suggest that changing Insignia's or Sierra Lens's institutions to those of Chile loud lead, in the long run, to a more than 7-fold increase in these countries' income. It is difficult to argue that these institutions are t herefore efficient for Nigeria, Sierra Leone or many other less-developed countries in Africa or Latin America. In the rest of the paper, we therefore focus on theories of institutions where societies may end up with institutions that are not optimal for aggregate growth or income. 2.The Incidental Institutions View The efficient institutions view is explicitly based on economic reasoning: the costs and benefits of different institutions are weighed against each other to determine which institutions should prevail. Efficiency arises because individuals calculate according to the social costs and benefits. Institutions are therefore choices. A different approach, popular among many political scientists and sociologists, is to downplay choices over institutions, but think of institutions as the byproduct of other social interactions. Here, we discuss three such theories.The first is the theory developed by Barrington Moore (1966) in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, th e second is Till's (1990) and Herb's (2001) theory of state formation, hill the third is Burner's (1976) theory of the emergence of capitalism in England. Barrington Moore constructed his famous theory in an attempt to explain the different paths of political development in Britain, Germany and Russia. In particular, he investigated why Britain had evolved into a democracy, while Germany succumbed to fascism and Russia had a communist revolution.Moore stressed the extent of centralization of agriculture and resulting labor relations in the countryside, the strength of the ‘bourgeoisie,' and the nature of class coalitions. In his theory, democracy emerged when there was a strong, politically assertive, immemorial middle class, and when agriculture had commercialese so that there were no feudal labor relations in the countryside. Fascism arose when the middle classes were weak and entered into a political coalition with landowners.Finally, a agriculture was not commercialese and rural labor was repressed through feudal relationships. In Moor's theory, therefore, class coalitions and the way agriculture is organized determine which political institutions will emerge. Although Moore is not explicitly concerned with economic development, it is a direct implication of his analysis that societies may end up with institutions that do not maximize income or growth, for example, when they take the communist revolution path.While this theory is highly suggestive and clearly captures some of the potentially significant comparative facts there are clear problems with it. For instance, though Moor's remark â€Å"no bourgeoisie, no democracy' is famous, it is not clear from his analysis whether this is Just an empirical correlation or a causal theory. More generally, Moore does not clarify the connection between the formation of class coalitions and political outcomes. It is also not clear whether this theory is empirically successful.There are many examples of societ ies with relatively strong capitalist classes in Latin America, such as Argentina and Chile, which did not make the transition to a consolidated democracy until recently. In fact, in these societies capitalist classes appear to have supported the coups against democracy, suggesting that the role of the poor segments of the society (the working class) in inducing demagnification could be more important than that of the bourgeoisie (see Archduchesses, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, Guacamole and Robinson, Bibb).In a very different vein, Till (1990), building on the Hibernia tradition, proposed a theory of the formation of modern states. He argued extensively that modern state institutions such as fiscal systems, bureaucracy and parliaments are closely related to the need to raise resources to fight wars and thus arose in places with incessant inter-state competition. Herbs (2001) has recently provided a substantive extension of this line of research by applying it to the evolution of st ate institutions in Africa.He argues that the poor functioning of many modern African states is due to the fact that they caked the features–high population density and inter-state warfare— necessary for the emergence of the modern state. Although interesting and sweeping, this theory does not seem to accord well with a number of major facts. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we documented that among the former colonies, it was the less densely settled places that became richer.In fact, North America, Australia and New Zealand were very sparsely settled in 1 500, especially when compared to West Africa around the same time. Despite this, they developed effective states and institutions of private property. This suggests that the issues stressed by Till and Herbs are not the major determinants of institutions, at least, in the context of the development of institutions among the former European colonies, including Africa. Burner's (1976) theory of the rise of capitalism in Europe can also be thought as an example of the incidental institutions view.Although Brenner subscribes to the Marxist view of feudalism as an extractive institution (see next subsection), he interprets the rise of capitalism as the byproduct of the collapse of existing social institutions after the Black Death. Brenner argues that the decline of feudalism resulted from the successful class struggle by the relatively powerful British peasantry. Brenner, however, believes that the peasantry's aim was not to build capitalism; capitalism just emerged like an incidental phoenix from the ashes of feudalism.Because, economic growth required this set of (extractive) institutions to be replaced by capitalist institutions. Therefore, Burner's work also gives us an incidental- institutions theory for why some societies grow faster. None of these theories provide a framework that is at the same time consistent tit the first-order facts of comparative development and useful for generating predictions. Therefore, it is difficult to apply these theories to understand why some countries develop extractive institutions.Moreover, being trained as economists, we find it to be a shortcoming of this group of theories that institutions and political outcomes arise as byproducts, not as the direct consequences of actions taken by rational agents. The fact that the key outcomes are byproducts of other interactions, not choices, leads to the additional problem that these theories often do not generate tight empirical predictions (I. E. Comparative static). But an analysis of comparative development, above all else, requires comparative static results regarding when institutions of private property will emerge.In the remainder of the paper, we therefore focus on the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views to build a simple framework for comparative development. 3. The Rent-seeking View According to this view, institutions are not always chosen by the whole so ciety (and not for the benefit of the whole society), but by the groups that control political power at the time (perhaps as a result of conflict with other groups demanding more rights). These groups will choose the institutions that maximize their own rents, and the institutions that result may not coincide with those that maximize total surplus.For example, institutions that enforce property rights by restricting state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler who wants to appropriate assets in the future. By establishing property rights, this ruler would be reducing his own future rents, so may well prefer extractive institutions to institutions of private property. Therefore, equilibrium institutions will not be those that maximize the size of the overall pie, but the slice of the pie taken by the powerful groups. Why doesn't a Cease theorem type reasoning apply?Although a large literature, especially in industrial organization, has emphasized how informational problems may limit the empirical applications of the Cease theorem, we believe that the main reason for the non-applicability of the Cease theorem in politics is commitment problems (see Guacamole, 2001, for a more detailed discussion of this issue). If a ruler has political power concentrated in his hands, he cannot commit not to expropriate assets or revenues in the future. Effective property rights require that he credibly relinquishes political power to some extent.But according to the Occasion bargain, he has to be compensated for what he could have received using this power. Herein lies the problem. When he relinquishes his power, then he has no guarantees that he will receive the promised payments in the future. Therefore, by their very nature, institutions that regulate political and social power create commitment problems, and prevent Occasion bargains that are necessary to reach efficient outcomes. As an application, consider the decision of a powerful rich elite to mount a coup in a populist redistributive regime, such as that of Salvador Allendale in Chile in 1973.By undertaking a coup, the rich will ensure that economically. Why wouldn't the elite enter into a Occasion bargain with Allendale who would wish to place future restrictions on taxes so as to remove the threat of the coup? The problem, as pointed out and analyzed in Guacamole and Robinson (2001 a), is that the democracy cannot promise not to increase taxes again once the threat of the coup disappears. By its very nature, taxes are set by the politically powerful agents, determined by the institutions at that time.Promises made at the past may be worthless when they are not backed by political power. The first systematic development of this point of view is the economics literature is North (1981), who argued in the chapter on â€Å"A Neoclassical Theory of the State† that agents who controlled the state should be modeled as self-interested. He then argued that the set of property rights wh ich they would choose for society would be those that maximized their payoff and because of transactions costs' these would not necessarily be the set which maximized social welfare.Though his analysis does not clarify what he meant by transactions costs, problems of commitment might be one mispronunciation for this. The notion that elites may opt for extractive institutions to increase their incomes is of course also present in much of the Marxist and dependency theory literature. For example, Dobb (1948), Brenner (1976) and Hilton (1981) saw feudalism, contrary to North and Thomas (1976)g's model, as a set of institutions designed to extract rents from the peasants at the expense of social welfare.Dependency theorists such as Wholesalers (1974-1982), Rodney (1972), Frank (1978) and Cards and Falsetto (1979) argued that the international trading system was designed to extract rents from developing countries to the benefit of developed Mounties. Perhaps, the earliest, and often igno red, contribution to this line of reasoning is in the book by Beard (1913). Anticipating many of the insights of rational choice political science literature, Beard argued that the U. S.Constitution was an institution designed to benefit those who wrote it (such as James Madison) at the expense of the rest of society. Another important example of inefficient institutions designed to extract rents from the society is the Spanish colonial system (Stein and Stein, 1970, Coauthors, 1978, Lockhart and Schwartz, 1983). Finally, the notion that leaver is an inefficient institution designed to extract rents from slaves is also widespread (for example, Williams, 1944, Geneses, 1963, Beckoned, 1972).More recent, and for our purposes more relevant, contributions in this tradition have sought to explain comparative development. For example, in the context of Africa, Bates (1981) formulated an influential and important theory based on rent-seeking by elites. Bates argued that when elites were no t invested in the productive sectors of the economy, mostly agriculture in the context of Africa, and had to rely on urban interests to remain in power, they were likely to distort prices, for example by using marketing boards to transfer resources from the rural areas to the cities.The implications of this for political stability and economic growth were disastrous. Anger and Soulful (1997, 2000) have used related ideas to analyze long-term development in the Americas. They argued that the different paths of development observed in North and Latin America in the last 300 years were due to institutional differences. In North America institutions promoted development, in Latin America they did not. Why did Latin America develop a set of institutions that impeded Caribbean, the factor endowments were suitable for growing crops such as sugarcane.Such crops had large technical scale economies and could be cultivated by slaves, factors that led to large concentrations of landownership an d repressive institutions designed to control labor. Therefore, despite their costs for economic development, extractive institutions were adopted by elites who benefited from the system. On the other hand, in North America, factor endowments were suitable for growing crops with limited scale economies such as wheat, and this led to an egalitarian distribution of land, income and political power.Their theory therefore emphasizes the impact of factor endowments and technology on inequality and institutions building, and ultimately economic development. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000, 2001 a), we developed a complementary theory, emphasizing how European colonialists set up institutions of private property in areas where they settled in large numbers, since these institutions were directly affecting their own investments and well-being. This led us to emphasize how European settlements ere often conducive to the development of institutions of private property in the colonies .In contrast, European colonists introduced or took over existing extractive institutions in other colonies. They were more likely to do so when they did not settle, for example due to an adverse disease environment, and when extractive institutions were more profitable, for example, as in Central America where the densely settled large population could be forced to work for low wages in plantations or mines. These extractive institutions did not benefit the society as a whole, but they were inefficacy for the Europeans, who held the political power and were the extractors.We believe that the rent-seeking view provides the best framework for thinking about why certain countries ended up with extractive institutions, and provides a number of useful comparative static, which will be discussed in Section Ill. 4. The Inappropriate Institutions View According to this view, institutions may be efficient when they are introduced, but they are also costly to change (see below on this). Ther efore, institutions that are efficient for a set of circumstances may no longer be efficient once the environment hinges. Nevertheless, it may be difficult or too costly to change these institutions at this point.The idea here goes back to Crosschecking (1963). In the context of financial institutions, Crosschecking argued that certain arrangements, such as bank finance, might be more appropriate for backward countries trying to catch up. This is widely thought to be a good explanation for why banks are more prevalent in Germany, even today when Germany is no longer a backward country. So perhaps, social arrangements that were introduced at some point as an optimal response to the resistances may continue to prevail, even after they cease to be the optimal response.In the context of financial institutions, this point is developed in Guacamole, Action and Kilobit (2001). Another economic example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. David (1986) argued that this was appropriate at the t ime because it slowed down the speed of typing, when the rudimentary nature of typewriters meant that rapid typing would make them Jam. However, despite the fact that the QWERTY arrangement was inefficient once the basic technology improved soon after, it has similar thesis.Perhaps, extractive institutions were appropriate for certain resistances, but they continue to apply even after they cease to be the efficient institutional arrangement. Related ideas have been suggested in the literature. For example, Wittingly (1957) argued that centralized despotism, which may not have been very costly in terms of economic outcomes in China before the 1 5th century and arose as the result of providing desirable public goods such as irrigation, persisted almost to the present, creating a substantial economic and social burden.Given how long institutions persist (see Section ‘V) the view that institutions of a different age ay continue to apply even when they become costly to economic suc cess is highly plausible. Nevertheless, in the context of comparative development, it appears more useful to combine the inappropriate institutions view with the rent-seeking view, explicitly allowing for political elites to introduce inefficient institutions. In fact, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we suggested a hypothesis combining the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views, and provided evidence in favor of this hypothesis.We argued and empirically demonstrated that extractive institutions, tit power concentrated in the hand of a small elite, were much less costly during the age of agriculture than during the age of industry. When agriculture is the main source of income, and the political elite owns the land, this elite will have, to a first approximation, adequate incentives to increase the productivity of the land. In contrast, in the age of industry, many different agents, not previously part of the ruling elite, need to undertake investments and be involved in productive activities.Without effective property rights, these agents are unlikely to invest, so extractive institutions become much more costly once industrialization opportunities arrive on the scene. This explains why the sugar colonies of Barbados, Haiti and Jamaica were amongst the richest places in the world in 1700 but rapidly fell behind when industrial technologies became available. Overall, we therefore conclude that to understand the significant differences in how countries are organized, we need to move away from the pure efficiency view.Moreover, existing series of institutional differences based on the incidental institutions view cannot provide a satisfactory tarring point, and make less sharp empirical predictions, since institutions are simply byproducts of other social actions. Instead, we believe that conflict over the distribution of rents matters, and the rent seeking view provides the best starting place for an analysis of institutional differences across countries.In addition, there may be an important element of the inappropriate institutions view, so that institutions that were introduced at a certain point in time may become less appropriate and more â€Å"harmful† in the future, but may still remain in place. Ill. Institutional Origins The rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views do not immediately generate a theory of comparative institutions. They simply point out that inefficient institutions may be chosen by political elites, and the institutions in place may become more costly for growth over time.As discussed above, by the institutions hypothesis, we mean that differences in the development experiences of countries can be explained by differences in their institutions. To make this hypothesis operational, we need to choose institutions of private property. In other words, we need to develop comparative static on institution building. This is not an easy task. In fact, some of the pioneering theories of institutions, such as North (1981), give us few clues about when we should expect extractive institutions to prevail.Here, we highlight a few potential determinants of what type of institutions politically powerful groups will choose: 1. Economic Interests: A first determinant of whether institutions of private property will emerge is whether they will lead to outcomes that are in interests of the politically powerful agents. For example, institutions that restrict state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler ho wants to appropriate assets in the future.Yet this strategy may be in the interest of a ruler who recognizes that only such guarantees will encourage citizens to undertake substantial investments or lend him money, or will protect his own rents. They will also be in the interest of the major groups that can undertake investment in production activities in the future. Anger and Solidify explanation for why extractive institutions emerged in the Caribbean but not in North America falls within this category. In the Caribbean, the factor endowments made extractive institutions more profitable for the elite.In particular, sugar production, which could exploit economies of scale and profitably employ slave labor, was conducive to a society where a small elite would control both political and economic power. Our argument in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) for why European settlement in the colonies led to institutions of private property is also based on the same reasoning. When a large number of Europeans settled in an area, they preferred institutions enforcing property rights, since these property rights would enable them to undertake investments.Our argument in Guacamole Johnson and Robinson (2001 a) is also related. There, we suggested that high population density and relative prosperity (I. E. , GAP per capita) of the colonized territory encouraged European colonialists to set up extractive institutions. The reasoning is that high po pulation density implied a large labor force that Europeans could force to work for low wages, and both high population density and the relative prosperity of the population provided Europeans with a greater resource base for extraction or taxation. Economic interests† therefore suggest that we should expect extractive institutions to develop when the powerful agents have little to gain from enforcing property sights because they have few investment opportunities themselves and are not linked to other productive agents in the society, and when there are resources, such as crops or abundant labor, that can be effectively exploited by extractive 2.Political Losers: Another important factor is whether institutional development will destabilize the system, making it less likely that elites will remain in power after reforms. An institutional setup encouraging investment and adoption of new technologies may be blocked by elites when they fear that this process of growth and social change will

Comparing Synesthesia And The Bower Essay - 2303 Words

Synesthesia and the Bower: An Analysis of â€Å"Ode to a Nightingale† by John Keats Filled with sensorial imagery, John Keats’s use of the senses in â€Å"Ode to a Nightingale† leads to synesthetic description in order to convey what he is feeling and what he is imagining. This poem is based in a desire for escape and this is achieved through an imaginative bower in the speaker’s mind. The speaker is taken to this bower â€Å"on the viewless wings of Poesy† (Ode 928) whose song has put him into such a sublime state that his senses are heightened; due to these heightened sense, the speaker turns to synesthesia. Synesthesia, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is â€Å"the use of metaphors in which terms relating to one kind of sense-impression are used to describe sense-impressions of other kinds† (OED). This form description is used to describe the speakers the sensations he is feeling and the images in his imagination. The imaginatio n is where Keats’s bower is located which affects the definition of the bower. A bower, in the poetic sense, is supposed to be â€Å"an idealized abode, not realized in any actual dwelling† (OED) which is the reason the speaker flies there to escape, due to its idealized state. However, Keats’s ideas on the imagination affect the bower and ultimately lead to the speaker’s choice to leave the bower and return to reality. Through this journey, synesthesia is only seen in the instances of intense sensation in the speaker’s sublime state; meaning, when the speaker